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First draft of The Deal.

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48
bib/dealb.bib
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@ -296,3 +296,51 @@ keywords = {Boolean P systems, Boolean networks, Reachability, Complexity},
bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography,
https://dblp.org}
}
@article{BjornbergKGH2017,
title = {Climate and environmental science denial: A review
of the scientific literature published in 1990–2015},
journal = {Journal of Cleaner Production},
volume = 167,
pages = {229--241},
year = 2017,
issn = {0959-6526},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.08.066},
url =
{https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652617317821},
author = {Karin Edvardsson Björnberg and Mikael Karlsson and
Michael Gilek and Sven Ove Hansson}
}
@article{ONeillB2010,
author = {Saffron J. O’Neill and Max Boykoffb},
title = {Climate denier, skeptic, or contrarian?},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of
the United States of America},
volume = {107(39):E151},
doi = {doi:10.1073/pnas.1010507107},
year = {2010}
}
@misc{wikiClimate,
author = "{Wikipedia contributors}",
title = "Climate change --- {Wikipedia}{,} The Free
Encyclopedia",
year = "2024",
howpublished =
"\url{https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Climate_change&oldid=1210314463}",
note = "[Online; accessed 26-February-2024]"
}
@book{DryzekNS2011,
author = {Dryzek, John S. and Norgaard, Richard B. and
Schlosberg, David},
title = "{The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society}",
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2011},
month = {08},
isbn = {9780199566600},
doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566600.001.0001},
url =
{https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566600.001.0001},
}

121
deal.tex
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@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ the cytoskeletal track it is attached to
\label{fig:ratchet-motor}
\end{figure}
\section{A Deal: Mutually beneficial interactions}
\section{The Deal: Mutually beneficial interactions}
\label{sec:deals}
Seeing Life as an ensemble of machines biases how we expect to collect
@ -347,12 +347,119 @@ asymmetric relationship between the controller and the controlled,
which is unnatural biological context because both the controller and
the controlled are made out of the same kind of matter, and are
ultimately embedded in the same environment.
of a Deal with Life is to render the interactions \emph{mutually
beneficial}: ideally, both systems engaging in the interaction
should benefit from it. In practice, this should be translated into
joint maximization of a pair of functions measuring the utility of the
interaction for both parties, possibly with one of the two functions
being prioritized over the other.
This chapter outlines a conceptual framework putting symmetry back
into the picture, \emph{the Deal with Life}: instead of
surreptitiously lifting the human above and out of the living matter
by self-designating ourselves as superior Engineers, I propose to
account for the fact that we act \emph{within} Life and its complex
feedback loops by looking to organize \emph{mutually beneficial
interactions} with the living systems, as opposed to trying to
control, hack, or engineer them. Since we are talking about the
general mindset, the choice of words in not contingent: controlling,
hacking, and engineering impose a vertical power relationship, while
thinking in terms of mutual benefit admits that our target system has
a trajectory of its own, which we would like to preserve it to some
degree. Playing with words and summarizing the control-hack-engineer
mindset as ``We control, Life obeys'' makes the power imbalance even
more striking.
Today, the most obvious inspiration for considering mutual benefit
comes from the climate crisis: for centuries, we have acted on the
environment expecting it to behave like a heat bath, i.e., to absorb
whatever we throw at it without essentially changing its state.
Besides brandishing a certain naïveté, this point of view is so
difficult to abandon that is has become the epitome of science denial
according to certain studies,
e.g.~\cite{BjornbergKGH2017,ONeillB2010,wikiClimate}, as well
as~\cite[page~155]{DryzekNS2011}. As these references and multiple
others show, refusing to admit human cause as central to the climate
crisis has been invariably and strongly supported by the fossil fuel
industry. I suspect nevertheless that one of the reasons for the
resilience of the denialist mindset is the deeply anchored feeling
that we are engineers and the environment a mere tool. My own
inspiration for the Deal with Life comes from theoretical biology
discussions with Nicolas \textsc{Glade} at the TIMC lab in
Grenoble\footnote{\url{https://www.timc.fr/}}, and specifically from
the remarks outlined in Section~\ref{sec:mechanicism} above concerning
the dominance of the engineering mindset in modern biology, especially
in molecular biology, and the ruts it forces our thinking in.
Thinking about mutual benefit in dealing with Life unpacks multiple
different levels of caring about the destiny of the system of
interest:
\begin{itemize}
\item \emph{Level 0}: This is the Engineer's mindset: fundamental
reductionism and mechanicism---we control, Life obeys. At this
level, we do not conceive of any kind of benefit to the
target system.
\item \emph{Level 1}: We aim to preserve the destiny of the target
system to a certain degree. If it is a yeast population, we may
want to not allow its size below a certain threshold, or if it is
a farm animal, we may want to ensure a certain quality of life
according to a set of measures.
\item \emph{Level 2}: We aim to benefit the target system to a certain
degree, while also extracting our own profit from the interaction.
In the case of a farm animal, we may want to ensure that its the
state of well-being be \emph{improved} in the context of its
interaction with respect to a life without any human intervention.
\end{itemize}
All three levels of this hierarchy of mutual benefit are in fact
already present in our interactions with living organisms.
Respecting Level 1 is almost ubiquitously needed, since otherwise we
may kill the system of interest before it is capable of producing the
deliverable we are after. Level~2 manifests itself to different
degrees in interactions with domesticated animals, especially in the
context of increased awareness of the conditions to which livestock
are typically treated in modern agriculture. Levels 1 and 2 are also
progressively making their way to prominence in dealing with
ecosystems: cutting down forests brings about various kinds of
catastrophes, so it is now laudable to curb deforestation, and even to
conduct reforestation campaigns.
It would seem on the other hand that biomedical research is stubbornly
fond of ignoring Levels~1 and 2, and instead focuses on proudly
brandishing the Engineer's Level 0, claiming that if something does
not work out today, it will certainly work out tomorrow, provided that
tomorrow brings around more energy, more computing power, more
workforce, more data. Yet again, in no way do I aim to deny or
minimize the benefits of mechanicism and reductionism in
biology---which has been instrumental in multiple groundbreaking
achievements over the 20th century and beyond. I insist nevertheless
that exclusively sticking to Level 0 of the hierarchy of mutual
benefit is a fundamental limitation of thought. Lifting this
limitation will undoubtedly open up a multitude of new approaches and
solutions, as this chapter attempts to outline.
A final argument for taking into consideration the destiny of the
system of interest which has been lurking around the corner the whole
time is that we as humans do not often have a choice on this matter:
the living system serving as a target is often required to survive our
intervention, and sometimes to maintain the majority of the functions
it had before the intervention. That biomedical research is reluctant
to go from accepting this obvious constraint to taking more holistic
approaches including mutual benefit is possibly due to the complexity
that awaits us on the very threshold of the comfortable Engineer's
mindset. In other words, it is much easier to see the disease as
separate from the carrying organism, and imagine curative strategies
tightly focused on a well defined set of diseased structures than to
admit that the onset of the disease is a consequence of a complex
interplay of multiple factors. Indeed, conceiving of diseases from
this more holistic viewpoint is often prohibitively complex with the
currently available data and knowledge, all while the reductionist
approach gives at least some solutions. I claim however that this is
no way should hinder our motivation to tackle the complexity of the
more holistic approach.
Finally, the way I employ the terms ``deal'' and ``mutual benefit''
corroborates no particular social ideology. The Deal with Life simply
calls for including the potential benefit of the target system into
the picture by establishing a measure of it. It is up to the
protagonists of the concrete context, problem, or practical
application to decide whether, how much, and in which way to
prioritize this benefit over the profit we humans are expecting
to extract.
\printbibliography[heading=subbibliography]